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Resolving the Inconsistency between National and EU Motor Insurance 
Law. Was Factortame the Solution nobody Sought? 
 
Abstract 
 
In this article we argue that the continued uncertainty of UK national motor vehicle insurance 
law when viewed in respect of its EU parent, the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directive (MVID), 
has not been satisfactorily addressed using the remedy available through the non-contractual 
liability of the State. The existing enforcement mechanisms have equally been haphazard in 
their effectiveness and success in affording rights to third-party victims. Given the link between 
the MVID and the free movement of persons and goods on which the harmonization of 
insurance protection was based, we present the first article establishing an argument for the 
offending aspects of UK national law to be disapplied. Whilst the UK has concluded its 
agreement to withdraw its membership from the EU and thus to be bound by EU law and the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, until the transitional period is completed the UK remains 
aligned to EU law. It is committed to follow superior EU law and the judgments of the Court 
of Justice. Hence the remedy issued from the Factortame line of case authorities may prove to 
be the most effective way to grant access to rights which continue to be denied to victims in 
the UK. 
 
KEYWORDS: Breach of EU law; Factortame; Francovich v Italy; HS2; motor vehicles; 
MVID.     
 
A. Introduction 
 
As is well understood, the European Union, in its present and previous incarnations, was 
designed to facilitate a common market between its Member States (similar to a domestic 
market). One of the essential conditions to bring this to fruition was the establishment of free 
movement of goods and of persons, and key to this aim was to create a minimum standard of 
compulsory motor vehicle insurance. Such a system of compulsory insurance cover against 
civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles would protect the interests of victims of 
accidents and remove disparities of legal protection between the States. Hence, by establishing 
a system of compulsory motor vehicle insurance between Member States, individuals and other 
motorists would be free to travel throughout the EU knowing that minimum standards of cover 
would be in place to compensate the third-party victims of accidents involving motor vehicles. 
This was achieved, first, through the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directive (MVID) of 19721 and 
then a subsequent series of MVID2 which expanded the protection of third-party victims and 
requiring Member States to establish a national compensatory body to provide a remedy to this 
class of victim in the event that they had no insurer from which to recover damages.3 In the 
UK this body, established many years prior to the MVID’s creation, is the Motor Insurers’ 
Bureau4 (MIB) and it is a requirement for every insurer operating in the UK to be a member of 
the MIB. Indeed, a percentage from every motor insurance premium paid in the UK is taken 
by the MIB to fund this compensatory scheme. 
                                                 
1 (The First Directive) Council Directive 72/166/EEC [1972] OJ L103/1. 
2 (The First Directive) Council Directive 72/166/EEC [1972] OJ L103/1; (The) Second Council Directive 
84/5/EEC [1984] OJ LL8/17; (The) Third Council Directive 90/232/EEC [1990] OJ L129/33; Directive 
2000/26/EC (The Fourth Motor Insurance Directive) [2000] OJ L181/65; (The Fifth Directive) Directive 
2005/14/EC [2005] OJ L149/14; and (The Sixth Directive) Directive 2009/103/EC [2009] OJ L263/11. 
3 Established in the Second Council Directive 84/5/EEC [1984] OJ LL8/17. 
4 Of course, similar organisations exist in each Member State. 
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Due to the nature of the requirement to protect victims in the event of no insurer being available 
to provide damages, the MIB entered into a series of agreements with the Secretary of State 
(the UK government). These agreements were titled the Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement (to be 
used where the driver had no insurance policy in place at the time of the accident or where the 
insurer used a provision within an existing contract to avoid its responsibilities) and the 
Untraced Drivers’ Agreement (for events where the vehicle causing the accident could not be 
traced – for example with so called “hit and run” incidents). The national legislation in place, 
the Road Traffic Act 1988 (RTA88) along with the extra-statutory Uninsured Drivers’ 
Agreement (UDA) and the Untraced Drivers’ Agreement (UtDA) operate to give effect to the 
MVID and the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice. 
 
Perhaps one of the more controversial aspects of the literature, commentary and judicial 
examination of national motor vehicle insurance law has been the discussion surrounding the 
enforcement of the MVID in the UK.5 It has been a consistent source of uncertainty, however, 
due to the general disregard of the law nationally, it has also led to successes where third party 
victims of motor vehicle accidents have obtained judgments against the State under a 
Francovich6 action. Indirect effect has also been a doctrine receptive of some courts, although 
the distinction between a Marleasing7 approach and that required in Pfeiffer,8 which expands 
the duty of purposive interpretation,9 seems to have been underutilised nationally. Most 
recently, in MIB v Lewis,10 the Court of Appeal confirmed that aspects of the MVID have direct 
effect and the MIB is an emanation of the State. This ruling has broadened the opportunity for 
                                                 
5 As just an example of the critical writing in this area see Nicholas Bevan writing for the NEW LAW JOURNAL 
which includes: Motor Insurance Law Change 166 NLJ 7703, 5 (2016); Putting Wrongs to Rights (Pt 2) 166 NLJ 
7701, 13 (2016); Putting Wrongs to Rights (Pt 1) 166 NLJ 7700, 17 (2016); Redress Road 166 NLJ 7700, 5 
(2016); Still Driving Dangerously 166 NLJ 7693, 18 (2016); A Call for (More) Reform 165 NLJ 7661, 9 (2015); 
No Through Road 165 NLJ 7648, 7 (2015); Delaney Sets a New Insurance Route 165 NLJ 7644, 4 (2015); High 
Impact 164 NLJ 7628, 5 (2014); Ignore at Your Peril 164 NLJ 7628, 7 (2014); Bad Law 164 NLJ 7624, 7 (2014); 
UK in Breach Over Uninsured Drivers 164 NLJ 7610, 4 (2014); Untraced Drivers’ Scheme is Car Crash 164 
NLJ 7598, 4 (2014); On the Right Road (Pt IV)163 NLJ 193 (2013); On the Right Road? (Pt III) 163 NLJ 160 
(2013); On the Right Road? (Pt II) 163 NLJ 130 (2013); On the Right Road? 163 NLJ 94 (2013); Asleep at the 
Wheel? 163 NLJ 7556, 10 (2013). James Marson and Katy Ferris have published the following Too Little, Too 
Late? Brexit Day, Transitional Periods and the Implications of MIB v Lewis EUROPEAN LAW REVIEW (in 
press) (2020); The Compatibility of English Law with the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives: The Courts 
Giveth… But will Brexit Taketh Away 136 LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW. 35-40 (2020); For the Want of 
Certainty: Vnuk, Juliana and Andrade and the Obligation to Insure 82(6) MODERN LAW REVIEW. 1132-1145 
(2019); Brexit means Brexit: What does it mean for the Protection of Third Party Victims and the Road Traffic 
Act? STATUTE LAW REVIEW, 39 (2), 211-27 (2018); Motor Vehicle Insurance Law: Ignoring the Lessons 
from King Rex 38(5) BUSINESS LAW REVIEW, 178-186 (2017); Misunderstanding and Misapplication of 
Motor Insurance Law. Will the Supreme Court come to the Rescue? 23 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF CURRENT 
LEGAL ISSUES (2) (2017); The Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement 2015 as a Legitimate Source of Authority 38(2) 
STATUTE LAW REVIEW, 133-146 (2017); Delaney and the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives: lessons for 
the teaching of EU law 50 LAW TEACHER, 1-17 (2017); Which is the Applicable Law in Recovery of Losses 
from an Uninsured Driver? Moreno v The Motor Insurers’ Bureau [2016] UKSC 52 22 EUROPEAN JOURNAL 
OF CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES, (3) (2016); and, with Alex Nicholson, Irreconcilable Differences? The Road 
Traffic Act and the European Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives THE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW, 1, 51-
70 (2017). 
6 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci and others v Italy [1991] ECR I-5357. 
7 Case C-106/89 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA [1990] ECR I-4135. 
8 Bernhard Pfeiffer et alia v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband Walshut eV [2004] ECR 1-8835. 
9 “when the national court is seised of a dispute concerning the application of domestic provisions which, as here, 
have been specifically enacted for the purpose of transposing a directive intended to confer rights on individuals. 
The national court must… presume that the Member State, following its exercise of the discretion afforded it 
under that provision, had the intention of fulfilling entirely the obligations arising from the directive concerned.” 
10 MIB v Lewis [2019] EWCA Civ 909; [2019] 6 WLUK 26. 
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those directly effective aspects of the MVID to be given effect in national courts. Collectively, 
each of the above mechanisms for the enforcement of EU law or in providing a financial 
remedy to the victim have been rather limited in practical terms, frequently because of the 
opaqueness of the remedies and, as Marson and Ferris11 explain, the teaching of EU law 
principles often fail to instil in future lawyers and judges the muscle-memory of assessing, 
comparatively, EU laws and their national transposing measures. Whilst not an enforcement 
mechanism, as it forms part of a body of rules which enables affected individuals to seek 
redress from the State for damages or loss caused by its breach of EU law, “state liability” is a 
mechanism which has been available as a source of redress for third-party victims. The doctrine 
of state liability, established in Francovich,12 will be remembered as a means for affected 
individuals to recover damages, yet even with some notable successes in the area of motor 
vehicle insurance,13 using it to compel Member States to adhere to their EU legal 
responsibilities has seen limited success. Indeed, it can also be stated with a degree of certainty 
that over many years, and until relatively recently by the Court of Appeal14 and Ward LJ in 
particular on frequent occasions, that the courts have been reluctant to find the UK in breach 
of the MVID. This was notably demonstrated in the failed judicial review of the law started by 
the charity Roadpeace.15 The cases demonstrate the need for fresh thinking around granting 
third-party victims of motor vehicle accidents access to their EU rights in light of a recalcitrant 
UK. 
 
In addressing the instances of the UK breaching its obligations under the MVID, the problems 
inherent in the available enforcement mechanisms and the limitations in actions under state 
liability, an argument is presented for the inconsistent national laws in motor vehicle insurance 
to be disapplied. Thus, Factortame16 as a model for the halting of the application of laws in 
breach of the MVID may ensure compliance with superior EU law in a way that has been 
hitherto impossible to achieve. As far as the authors are aware, at present there have been no 
arguments presented on this basis and in light of the dicta in the Supreme Court judgment in R 
(HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport,17 an argument is presented that 
national courts not only can, but have a legal duty to strike down aspects of an Act of Parliament 
that does not comply with EU law.18 Whilst it is accepted that Factortame19 was based on a 
Treaty Article and not an EU Directive, the MVID have their origin as giving effect to 
fundamental principles of the free movement of goods and of people. However, by extension, 
in HS220 it was possible to argue (albeit by the judiciary in a hypothetical setting)21 that EU 
Directive 2011/92/EU should prevent the application of inconsistent national law relating to 
                                                 
11 James Marson & Katy Ferris, Delaney and the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives: lessons for the teaching of 
EU law, 51 THE LAW TEACHER 411–427 (2016). 
12 Cases C-6/90 and 9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci v Republic of Italy [1991] I-5357. It ruled that it is a principle 
of Community law, inherent in the system of the EC Treaty, “that the Member States are obliged to make good 
loss and damage caused to individuals by breaches of Community law for which they can be held responsible.” 
13 Delaney v Secretary of State for Transport [2015] EWCA Civ 172 and EUI v Bristol Alliance Partnership 
[2012] EWCA Civ 1267. 
14 Bristol Alliance Ltd Partnership v Williams [2012] EWCA Civ 1267 and Sahin v Havard [2016] EWCA Civ 
1202. 
15 RoadPeace v Secretary of State for Transport and Motor Insurers' Bureau [2017] EWHC 2725. 
16 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame (No 2) [1991] 1 AC 603. 
17 R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3. 
18 Jay J. Arangones, Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport Ex Parte Factortame Ltd.: The Limits of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Rule of Community Law 14(3) FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW 
JOURNAL 778-818 (1990). 
19 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci and others v Italy [1991] ECR I-5357. 
20 Supra note 17. 
21 Id. as explained at paras. 93 and 94. 
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decision-making – in this case that concerning the construction of a new highspeed railway. 
Thus, in relation to the Treaty provisions of free movement of people and goods (Factortame)22 
and the adherence of national laws and administrative provisions to comply with an EU 
Directive (HS2)23 the argument presented here may be more persuasive and result in a 
paradigm-shift in enforcement of EU motor vehicle insurance law in the UK. At least whilst 
the UK remains a Member State.24 
 
B. The Free Movement Principle and Motor Vehicle Insurance… 
 
The Free movement of EU citizens within the Community can be traced to the establishment 
of the European Economic Community in 1957,25 being later developed under the Treaty of 
Maastricht in 1992. However, EU citizens’ right to move and reside in other EU States with, 
to some extent, no restriction had not been achieved at this stage but required the passing of 
Directive 2004/38/EC26 to give effect to this Treaty principle. The ultimate aim of the Treaty, 
and given effect via the enactment of secondary law, was to establish a Community where EU 
citizens can live, travel and move freely with as few restrictions as possible. It was borne of 
anti-discrimination and sought to harmonize rules through the Community to facilitate free 
movement of persons and goods. 
 
Free movement of EU citizens is a fundamental principle of the Treaty enshrined in Articles 
21 and 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) as well as Article 
3(2) of the Treaty on European Union. Article 45 of the TFEU states clearly that “Freedom of 
movement for workers shall be secured within the Community.” It is a treaty requirement, 
which has direct effect on national courts of EU Member States without the need for further 
legislation for implementation. Therefore, and in order for national States to secure freedom of 
movement as required under the Treaty, States need to ensure that people are fully protected 
when moving from one State to another. In other words, EU individuals shall not face any 
obstacles that restrict their rights of movement such as facing different levels of insurance cover 
and protections that may undermine their rights when they become victims of incidents 
involving motor vehicles simply because they have crossed borders within the Community. 
Any such restriction would be interpreted as a breach of the Treaty and requires correction. 
Furthermore, the EU, in the First MVID,27 aimed from the outset to “liberalise the rules 
regarding the movement of persons and motor vehicles travelling between Member States.”28 
Therefore, EU Member States such as the UK, which have been in breach of these requirements 
should correct the wrong and bring its national law into compliance with the MVID. This 
ensures the requirement of minimum standards of insurance are met for those travelling 
throughout the EU, and it ensures that cross-border travel is harmonized to the extent that no 
hinderance to people and vehicles is experienced when moving from one State to another.   
                                                 
22 Supra note 12.  
23 Supra note 17.  
24 According to the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, the UK’s transitional period and 
continued relationship with the EU will cease on the 31 December 2020 and the Act will enter into force. 
25 Provisions 1(1), 1(2), 1(5) and 2(1)(4). 
26 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens 
of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States 
amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 
73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC. 
27 First Council Directive 72/166/EEC of 24 April 1972 on the approximation of the laws of Member States 
relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and to the enforcement of the 
obligation to insure against such liability. 
28 Preamble to the Directive. 
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C. … And its Significance to the Community 
 
Free movement of people is one of the four founding principles upon which the EU is based. 
Article 3 of the Treaty of Lisbon provides that “The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values 
and the well-being of its peoples... and shall promote social justice and protection.” From this 
it is derived that free movement is a fundamental principle of the Community that cannot be 
achieved without social justice and protection. The EU’s values which include “equality and 
the rule of law” cannot be achieved by, for instance, having different treatment for victims of 
uninsured or untraced drivers in comparison to claims made directly to insurers just because 
the driver at fault was uninsured or the vehicle unidentified.29 Furthermore, it breaches citizens’ 
rights to have their rights protected as it undermines other EU values (the rule of law) when 
the UK’s motor insurance law30 breaches the MVID.  
 
One of the drawbacks of the First MVID was the disparity in legal protection afforded third-
party victims between Member States, which was deemed a substantial barrier to free 
movement. This was especially in respect of the scope of insurance cover and the exclusion 
clauses to the responsibilities of insurers permitted by each State.31 This undermined the 
effectiveness of free movement. It entailed a Second Directive32 to be passed to remedy these 
drawbacks. The UK, however, was reluctant to remove these existing obstacles that were 
leading to the disparities in respect of the scope and exclusion clauses permitted within its 
national law. Whilst the RTA 1930 was the basis on which the First MVID was founded, it was 
clear that while the EU, since 1983, was attempting to develop the law to avoid the negative 
consequences experienced by third-party victims of accidents involving motor vehicles, the 
UK, and its close relationship with the national motor vehicle insurance industry, was reluctant 
to adopt the changes required of it. For the EU, the consequence of failing to facilitate free 
movement would be to undermine the aims of the Community which included facilitating 
tolerance across the Community, to build trust and to deepen integration between the different 
cultures within the EU. Therefore, and to ensure the protective purposes of the MVID was not 
undermined by national laws, the law required amendment to facilitate compliance. In the UK, 
the RTA88, and the MIB Agreements, in many respects do not comply with the aims of the 
MVID to provide the precise levels of protection and thereby facilitating the free movements 
of people, goods and (therein vehicles) in the Community.  
 
D. But Should the UK’s Motor Insurance Law Be Disapplied? The Offending 
Provisions Apt for Disapplication 
 
                                                 
29 Equality and the rule of law cannot be achieved too if citizens of one Community face different legal systems 
based on where an incident takes place. 
30 Throughout this article the terms “UK national law” or “UK law” will be used. This is for simplicity to draw 
attention to the difference between this law (namely the laws of England and Wales) and those at the EU level. 
31 Compare, for example the extent to the permissible exclusions of liability, still in existence in s. 148 RTA88, 
and which have been subject to academic scrutiny and condemnation whilst the Court of Justice, in Finanger v 
Norway (National Association for Road Traffic Victims, intervening) [2006] 3 CMLR 13, stated  “The Motor 
Vehicle Insurance Directives do not grant national authorities a margin of political or economic discretion with 
regard to the requirement of insurance… The purpose was to pave the way for a Common Market with free 
movement, and one of the means was to achieve security for the survivors of road traffic accidents... The 
development from the first to the third Directive shows that a strong degree of protection was intended, so that 
the various exemption rules that existed in certain countries were forbidden.” 
32 (The) Second Council Directive 84/5/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to 
insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles [1984] OJ LL8/17.  
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In both Delaney v Secretary of State for Transport33 and EUI v Bristol Alliance Partnership34 
not only were national appeal courts confused as to the requirements of UK national law in 
relation to their EU parent, but the cases were also notable for the claimant successfully 
obtaining redress from the State in a Francovich35 action. However, when one considers the 
scale of the errors present in the rulings by the courts in the UK as to the compatibility of 
national legislation with the MVID, these add weight to the argument for the necessity of a 
disapplication of the offending laws. The article continues the discussion by, briefly, 
identifying the most egregious breaches of EU law and those areas which require disapplying 
in the RTA88, the UDA 2015 and the UtDA 2017. This is not an exhaustive list, but simply 
used to represent the most obvious and serious breaches of EU law which affect the rights of 
third-party victims. Presented here are examples of the misunderstanding of the two sources of 
law by, frequently, the most senior appeal courts in the UK and are presented to exemplify the 
misconstruction of legal principles and doctrine, not decisions based on case facts.  
 
I. The RTA88 
 
Beginning with the RTA88, the present scope of ss. 143, 145, 148, 150, 151(4), 151(5) in 
relation to 151(8), 185, and 19236 cause problems with a consistent interpretation with the 
MVID and remain in breach of EU law. Section 143 requires that “a person must not use a 
motor vehicle on a road [or other public place] unless there is in force… such a policy of 
insurance… as complies with the requirements of this part of the Act.”37 This section is in 
breach of Articles 1 and 3 of the MVID and the rulings of Vnuk38 and subsequent case 
authorities, and this breach continues in relation to ss. 145 and 185 RTA88 with the definition 
of “motor vehicle.” In Vnuk,39 the Court of Justice extended the requirement for compulsory 
motor vehicle insurance to apply to private land. This was in contradiction with the RTA88 
which limits compulsory insurance to a “road or other public place.”40 Despite further rulings 
confirming this point of law (notably in Andrade41 and Juliana),42 and that Vnuk43 was decided 
in 2014, the RTA88 still has not been amended nor has definitive guidance, to aid legal 
certainty,44 been issued by the UK government. These cases, not only explaining the 
requirement for insurance for vehicles used on private land, also explained the law relating to 
                                                 
33 Delaney v Secretary of State for Transport [2015] EWCA Civ 172. 
34 EUI v Bristol Alliance Partnership [2012] EWCA Civ 1267. 
35 Supra note 16. 
36 The definition of road or other public place. This section of the RTA88 breaches Articles 1 and 3 of the 6th 
MVID. 
37 Similar requirements are placed on authorized insurers in s. 145 RTA88. 
38 Case C-162/13 Damijan Vnuk v Zavarovalnica Triglav [2014] EUECJ C-162/13. [2016] RTR 10. 
39 Id. 
40 Section 145. 
41 Case C‑514/16 Isabel Maria Pinheiro Vieira Rodrigues de Andrade, Fausto da Silva Rodrigues de Andrade v 
José Manuel Proença Salvador, Crédito Agrícola Seguros — Companhia de Seguros de Ramos Reais SA, Jorge 
Oliveira Pinto [2018] 4 WLR 75, [2017] WLR(D) 788, ECLI:EU:C:2017:908, [2017] EUECJ C-514/16, 
EU:C:2017:908. 
42 Case C-80/17 Fundo de Garantia Automóvel v Alina Antónia Destapado Pão Mole Juliana and Cristiana 
Micaela Caetano Juliana [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:661. 
43 Supra note 38. 
44 Which is a fundamental aspect of EU law. See Case C-308/06 R (International Association of Independent 
Tanker Owners (Intertanko)) v Secretary of State for Transport [2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 260, para 69 where the 
Court said: “The general principle of legal certainty, which is a fundamental principle of Community law, 
requires, in particular, that rules should be clear and precise, so that individuals may ascertain unequivocally 
what their rights and obligations are and may take steps accordingly (see [Belgium v Commission (Case C-
110/03) [2005] ECR I-2801, para 30, and IATA and ELFAA (Case C- 344/04) [2006] ECR I-403, para 68]). 
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the concept of the “use of a vehicle.” However, in Cameron v Liverpool Victoria Insurance45 
the Supreme Court misinterpreted UK national law and failed to give effect to these rulings.46 
Similarly, in Pilling v UK Insurance47 the Supreme Court also failed to reflect the geographic 
scope of the MVID and the incompatibility with s.145 RTA88. 
 
Section 148 includes statutory exclusion clauses in motor insurance policies which, if found, 
are to be held as void. Section 148(2) allows insurers to escape their responsibilities unless the 
exclusion falls into one of the “matters”48 as specified in that section.49 It had been questioned 
in Delaney50 whether the list of matters was illustrative or exhaustive. An exclusion of liability 
for domestic insurers is permissible in the MVID (at Article 13)51 and this is the only exclusion 
clause allowed. The UK’s approach, that s. 148(2) is to be interpreted as exhaustive and 
therefore any exclusion of liability outside of these prohibited “matters” is allowed, continues 
in its legislative form, but is clearly wrong in terms of EU law. The Court of Justice had 
previously held that the exclusion clause included under Article 13 of the MVID was 
exhaustive,52 but nevertheless, other exclusion clauses should not totally prevent third-party 
victims of their rights as responsibility to provide a remedy to third-party victims could be 
shifted to the national compensatory body (as required under Article 10 of the same 
Directive).53 In either way third-party victims must not be left uncompensated. Member States 
may need to regard the exclusion clauses in Article 13 of the MVID as a minimum requirement, 
and other exclusions may be only considered in respect of first, not third, party victims. The 
Court of Justice later clarified the issue surrounding the permissibility of other exclusion 
clauses. No other exclusions can be used against third-party victims.54 The Court of Justice in 
                                                 
45 Cameron v Liverpool Victoria Insurance [2019] UKSC 6. 
46 For commentary see Nicholas Bevan, Principle v Process 15 March NEW LAW JOURNAL 14 (2019). 
47 R & S Pilling t/a Phoenix Engineering v UK Insurance Ltd [2019] UKSC 16. 
48 Which include the age or physical/mental condition of persons driving the vehicle; the condition of the vehicle 
(for example, a car’s illegally worn (bald) tyres); the number of persons that the vehicle carries; the 
weight/physical characteristics of the goods which the vehicle carries; the time at which/areas within which a 
vehicle is used; the horsepower/cylinder capacity or value of the vehicle; the carrying on the vehicle of particular 
apparatus; or the carrying on the vehicle of any particular means of identification other than that required by law. 
49 It is interesting to note that the exclusion clauses in s. 148(2) RTA88 continue, yet the (similarly unlawful) 
provision in s. 152 RTA88 has recently been removed in The Motor Vehicles (Compulsory Insurance) 
(Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2019. 
50 Supra note 33. 
51 Article 13 identifies permissible exclusions in respect of third-party victims of road traffic accidents. Under this 
Article, neither statutory exclusions nor contractual clauses can be used by insurers to avoid liabilities for claims 
made by third-party victims. However, the Directive does allow a single exclusion where the victim knew that the 
vehicle he or she is travelling in is stolen and they voluntarily allowed themselves to be a passenger - and the 
insurer can prove that. Hence this requires actual knowledge on the part of the victim and that the insurer or 
compensatory body – the MIB in the UK – can prove this. 
52 Case C-129/94 Ruiz Bernáldez [1996] ECR I-1829. 
53 Member States are, under Article 10, required to set up a body with a fund that shall be always available for 
unsatisfied judgments. Its primary task, in other words, is to ensure that victims of uninsured or untraced drivers 
are compensated to the minimum (required) level of compensation that they might secure had the driver causing 
the accident been insured and the claim brought against their insurer. However, the chosen body has its liability 
limited to only those vehicles which fall under Article 3, which means that the compensatory body is not 
responsible for claims caused by derogated vehicles. Nonetheless, this exception is not to be misinterpreted by 
Member States to avoid liability towards victims of such vehicles, but the States are required to provide another 
mechanism of compensation such as local authority insurers, securities or another compensation scheme. 
54 Article 3 is perhaps the most important with regards to the obligation imposed on Members States to ensure 
third-party victims of road traffic accidents are protected. Under this Article, Member States must ensure that civil 
liability, in regard of the use of a vehicle on their territory, is covered by a minimum of third-party cover to ensure 
victims suffering loss or injury in the use of vehicles have their fair compensation met. According to Article 3, 
insurers are liable and shall compensate third-party victims of road traffic accidents for any personal injuries 
arising out of the use of a vehicle, regardless of the degree of relation between passengers and the policyholder. 
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a string of authorities (Bernaldez,55 Correia Ferreira v Companhia de Seguros Mundial 
Confiança SA,56 Candolin v Vahinkovakuutusosakeyhtio Pohjola,57 Farrell v Whitty,58 and 
Churchill v Wilkinson and Tracey Evans)59 identify the exclusions as illustrative and they 
cannot be viewed as exhaustive (thereby allowing all other exclusions not expressly precluded 
in this list). In other words, the Court regarded the exclusion clause allowed under Article 13 
as illustrative of what cannot be used against third-party victims. In this respect, unlike 
exhaustive exclusions, illustrative clauses can be used as guidance by Member States to operate 
in line with the protective purpose of the MVID by, for instance, using Pfeiffer60 to impose 
similar prohibited exclusions when it comes to third-party victims’ rights, and to ensure 
consistency across the Community. Failure to prohibit the use of a wider range of exclusion 
clauses may lead to a limiting of third-party victims’ rights to access compensation which 
might lead to different levels of cover depending on where the accident takes place. Such 
disparities oppose the uniformity of protection across the Community that the MVID aim to 
achieve. Therefore, third-party victims’ rights must be ensured access to fair compensation, 
either by insurers or the Compensatory Body, regardless.61 Returning to UK national law, the 
law is not certain in this respect as to limit insurers’ rights of applying exclusion clauses other 
than the that stated in Article 13 of the MVID. The law does permit a greater range of exclusion 
clauses through which an insurer is still capable of undermining third-party victims’ rights 
enshrined by the MVID. 
 
Section 150 RTA88 relates to insurance policies being issued on the basis of use of the vehicle 
for “social and domestic” use only. This provision breaches Articles 3 and 12(1) MVID and 
has required the judiciary in the UK to be creative in finding mechanisms and factual 
constructions to provide protection for third-party victims.62  
 
Section 151(4) relates to an exclusion of an insurer’s responsibility on the basis of the 
knowledge (which in the UK context may involve constructive knowledge) of the theft or the 
unlawful taking of a vehicle where the third-party (passenger) is injured. Such an exclusion 
breaches the permissible exclusion identified in Article 13(1) of the MVID. Section 151(5) 
RTA88 places a burden on to insurers to fulfil the cover provided in the policy of insurance, 
regardless of the breach of the policyholder, but, in conjunction with s. 151(8), allows the 
insurer to recover any funds paid to the third-party victim from the policyholder. It is possible 
that the third-party victim may also be the policyholder (as per Churchill Insurance v Wilkinson 
and Tracey Evans)63 and it is this application of the two aspects of the RTA88 which breach 
Article 13 MVID.  
 
In Delaney v Pickett,64 the insurer was successful in obtaining a declaration from the courts 
under s. 152(2) RTA88 due to the insured driver having failed to disclose relevant and material 
                                                 
55 Supra note 52. 
56 Case C-348/98 Vitor Manuel Mendes Ferreira and Maria Clara Delgado Correia Ferreira v Companhia de 
Seguros Mundial Confiança SA [2000] ECR 1-6711. 
57 Case C-537/03 Katja Candolin, Jari-Antero Viljaniemi and Veli-Matti Paananen v 
Vahinkovakuutusosakeyhti&ouml Pohjola and Jarno Ruokoranta [2005] ECR I-5745. 
58 Case C-356/05 Elaine Farrell v Alan Whitty [2007] ECR I-3067.  
59 Case C-442/10 Churchill Insurance Company Limited v Benjamin Wilkinson and Tracy Evans v Equity Claims 
Limited [2011] ECR I-00000. 
60 Supra note 8. 
61 Subjected to the only permitted exclusion clause in Article 13 of the MVID. 
62 E.g. Seddon v Binions [1978] RTR 163 and Keeley v Pashen [2004] EWCA Civ 1491. 
63 Supra note 59. 
64 Supra note 33. 
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facts which would otherwise have affected the insurer’s decision to provide cover. This has 
recently been repealed through reg. 6 of the Motor Vehicles (Compulsory Insurance) 
(Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2019. However, the Delaney65 decision was issued 
in 2011, the Regulations revoking the offending provision of the RTA88 were effective from 
1 November 2019, and significantly, the Court of Justice had ruled that such exclusions were 
contrary to the MVID in Bernaldez66 from 1996! Indeed, even though a consistent ruling was 
issued by the Court of Justice in Fidelidade-Compania de Seguros SA v Caisse Suisse de 
Compensation,67 the UK’s breach of the MVID and inconsistency with the jurisprudence of 
the Court of Justice was rejected by Ouseley J in the RoadPeace v Secretary of State for 
Transport and Motor Insurers’ Bureau68 judicial review hearing. As recently as 2019 in Colley 
v Shuker69 the s. 152 RTA88 exclusion was still being applied and used by insurers to escape 
their responsibilities.  
 
Finally, at s. 192, the definition of “road” continues despite the implications of Vnuk70 and the 
possible misreading as to their rights and obligations this creates for users (and arguably) 
insurers. 
 
II. The MIB Agreements: The UDA and the UtDA 
 
It is true that there is another route for compensation for third-party victims to follow (where 
insurers succeed in avoiding liability) in the event that the insurer choses to exercise an 
exclusion clause. This is where the national compensatory body (the MIB) would be involved 
through one of the Agreements (UDA or UtDA) – either dealing with the third-party victim’s 
claim directly or where the insurer would manage the claim through the UDA / UtDA itself. 
The question, though, is whether the scheme managed by the MIB offers comparable 
compensation and access to protection as a claim directly against the insurer on the terms found 
in the policy of insurance. The UK’s compensation scheme, which is supposedly designed to 
protect third-party victims of uninsured drivers / untraced vehicles, cannot be deemed to be 
fully implementing the MVID and it would be a potential aspect for future disputes as the 
current compensation scheme is neither equivalent nor effective in this respect to that required 
in the MVID. The failure is due to technical knock-out clauses, conflicting provisions and 
unfair procedural rules that innocent victims face when they are required to pursue their claims 
through the MIB Agreements which result in claims being concluded with less or no 
compensation awarded to victims at all. When scrutinized, it becomes readily obvious that the 
MIB’s Agreements, when compared with the minimum standards required under Community 
law, offer a level of protection to third-party victims that is neither equivalent to that under the 
Community law nor under similar claims made directly against insured drivers. The MIB may 
argue that its Agreements comply with the MVID and the current differences are not so 
significant as to hold it (the MIB) to be in breach of the Directive. However, no matter how 
small the (perceived) violation of the protection, the result is that the effects of the MVID are 
undermined by the Agreements. In Bernaldez71 the Court of Justice stated that insurers can 
neither rely on contractual terms nor on national law in order to avoid a claim raised by third-
                                                 
65 Id. 
66 Supra note 52. 
67 Case 287/16 Fidelidade Companhia de Seguros SA v Caisse Suisse De Compensation [2017] EUECJ. 
68 Supra note 15. 
69 Colley v Shuker [2019] EWHC 781 (QB). 
70 Supra note 38. 
71 Supra note 52. 
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party victims. Bernaldez72 requires Member States to ensure the effectiveness of the MVID to 
protect third-party victims of motor accidents. Therefore, the UK is obliged to take into account 
the EU principles of equivalence and effectiveness73 when dealing with claims made against 
uninsured drivers and in respect of untraced vehicles. Procedural rules imposed under the UDA 
2015 as well as the UtDA 2017 must not deprive innocent third-party victims of road traffic 
accidents of their rights but to ensure the right amount of compensation is awarded.74 In other 
words, to ensure effectiveness and equivalence in this respect, such claims shall follow the 
same procedural rules and get the same award as had it been dealt and awarded by insurers, 
which is not the case, at least for now, under the current MIB compensation scheme.  
 
At cl 5 of the UDA 2015, the MIB is not liable for any claim “arising out of the use of a vehicle 
which is not required to be covered by a contract of insurance75 unless the use is in fact covered 
by a contract of insurance.” Bodies do exist which would generally be able to meet claims in 
the event of them possessing no insurance cover for accidents involving their vehicles - the 
National Health Service and the police are perhaps the most obvious examples. The MVID, at 
Article 5, makes no such exception and the result is that a victim of an unauthorised driver 
(such as, for example, a “joy rider” who steals such a vehicle and causes an accident in the 
course of this venture) would be unable to recover damages from the MIB, which as a body 
exists to be the insurer of last resort. Clause 6 enables the MIB to avoid liability and/or deduct 
from payments any amount that a claimant would have been able to secure from another source 
(admittedly subject to certain exclusions). This might include from bodies such as the Criminal 
Injuries Compensation Authority but would also include those from an employer’s non-insured 
refundable advance. This deduction of compensation even extends to situations where the 
claimant failed to use, or to claim within the required time limits, from a personal insurance 
scheme. Whilst Article 10 MVID does allow for Member States to make deductions from a 
victim’s compensation payments, this was included to prevent the double payment of 
compensation (thus where Article 10 specifically refers to “social security bodies required to 
compensate the victim in respect of the same accident”). It does not exist to permit subrogation 
against victims of motor vehicle accidents. Clause 8 is applicable to situations where the victim 
allowed themselves to be a passenger in a vehicle to which either before the start of the 
claimant’s journey or after its start, they knew or had reason to believe that (a) the vehicle had 
been stolen or unlawfully taken; or (b) the vehicle was being used without there being in force 
a contract of insurance complying with the RTA88. MVID Article 10(2) permits the exclusion 
of liability from the MIB in relation to persons who the Member State (or in this instance the 
MIB) can prove / knew the vehicle in which they were travelling was uninsured. In White v 
White,76 the House of Lords at para. 34 of the judgment, extended the concept of knowledge to 
“turning a blind eye” as to whether insurance was held or not. However, there is no such 
inclusion of constructive knowledge in the MVID. It is clear that actual knowledge is required 
for the application of the MVID, and nothing less than this will offer the victim the same level 
of protection. 
 
The UtDA 2017 is the most recently altered of the MIB’s Agreements (it was effective for 
accidents occurring on and after 1 March 2017) yet it continues to breach aspects of the MVID. 
                                                 
72 Id. 
73 Case C-120/97 Upjohn Ltd v The Licensing Authority established by the Medicines Act 1968 and Others [1999] 
ECLI:EU:C:1999:14 at para. 32. 
74 Both Agreements govern uninsured driver and untraced vehicle accident claims. 
75 per RTA88 s. 144. 
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Some of the provisions included are merely archaic,77 yet they are fundamentally 
disadvantageous to potential claimants to the MIB. Beginning at s.1(5), the UtDA defines an 
“authorised person” as “a person acting on the claimant’s behalf who is recognised in law as 
having authority so to act but this does not include a solicitor or other legal representative of 
the claimant, unless appointed as the claimant’s Guardian or Deputy or a person authorised 
under an Intervention Order pursuant to section 53 of the Adults Incapacity (Scotland) Act 
2000” (authors’ emphasis). This definition is important in respect of cl. 10(1) which requires 
that the claimant, albeit with the assistance of an authorised person, comply with the 
requirements of the clause. Failure to comply enables the MIB to reject the claim. The clause 
specifically removes the right for a claimant to be assisted in their action with the MIB with 
qualified legal representatives. Given the plethora of irrelevant materials to which the MIB 
might require the claimant to provide access, and perhaps a solicitor would be aware of the 
potential problems and harm this might cause the claimant better than a non-legally qualified 
lay person, the specific removal of lawyers from this aspect of the claim is as surprising as it 
is worrisome. Completing the claim and early correspondence with the MIB is often the first, 
crucial stage, in a claim and to not enable a victim to have assistance from a solicitor is quite 
unusual. 
 
The UtDA include various procedural aspects which contradict or undermine the effectiveness of the 
MVID. With regards to damage sustained to property, the UtDA stipulates that an award is 
conditional on a claimant suffering personal injury from the same accident. The injury must 
however be “significant” in order for the MIB to proceed the claim for property damage and 
this means the value of any claims must exceed £400. Such requirements reflect a general lack 
of good faith and whilst the MIB may argue for the need to take these measures to prevent 
fraud, they nevertheless should not operate at the expense of innocent victims of untraced 
drivers. There should, rather, be a balanced assessment given it is the duty of the MIB to have 
the right measures to control for such issues, not the victims. Therefore, the MIB should not be 
in a position to exploit such incidents to undermine third-party victims’ rights of untraced 
drivers and thereby the MVID.  
 
Under cl 8(1) of the UtDA 2017, the MIB has the right to deny any liability in respect of death, 
bodily injury or property damage arising out of the use of a vehicle where a claimant voluntarily 
let themselves to be a passenger in a vehicle and they “knew or ought to have known” that the 
concerned vehicle; a) was stolen or unlawfully taken, or b) uninsured according to the national 
requirement (Pt VI of the RTA 1988). This wording, already identified in the line of judicial 
reasoning outlined above, continues to use the constructive knowledge definition which is 
beyond that allowed in the MVID and thereby negatively affects the efficacy and protective 
purpose of the Directive. Indeed, it is in a practical sense difficult to ascertain how a passenger 
would know, and this being proved, that a vehicle was uninsured. If the MIB can prove that 
the claimant knew or had reason to believe in any of such matters then the MIB would be 
deemed to discharge its duty in respect of knowledge. The knowledge requirements under this 
Agreement seems to be sufficiently wide to make it easy for the MIB to shift the burden of 
                                                 
77 For example, at cl. 24, the MIB requires notice of documents and claims to be served to it via fax or recorded 
delivery (which, incidentally, has been abolished as a form of communication in the UK). The MIB does reserve 
the right to accept communications in another form, but this either has to be the choice of the MIB to accept this 
form of communication or it has to be conclusively proved that the MIB did in fact receive the notice. In 2017, 
with the range of electronic communications systems quite readily used by businesses and legal professionals and 
professional bodies, to insist on the use of such old-fashioned mechanisms remains surprising. It might be 
surmised that this has been stipulated in the “new” Agreement to make communication of notice more difficult 
and hence to reduce the number of claims to the MIB. 
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proof to the victim, which can be deemed to breach the clear and simple requirement applied 
under the MVID (see Phillips v Rafiq).78 
 
There are certain requirements that any law is expected to respect (and beyond the formalities 
of its construction and adherence to constitutional requirements it should, as a minimum, 
provide a level of legal certainty) otherwise its legitimacy may be called into question. One of 
the fundamental requirements of the UK’s constitution and the rationale advanced for 
contravening aspects of the RTA88 and the UDA and UtDA to be disapplied stems from the 
European Communities Act 1972 and associated case law which provides a means for the 
courts to adopt this course of action if they so choose. It is argued here that the UK’s motor 
insurance laws breach fundamental principles of EU law. The national laws (the RTA88 and 
the MIB Agreements) may be argued to breach aspects of the EU’s free movement principles 
when failing to provide the necessary protection for EU citizens (here it would be third-party 
victims of motor vehicle accidents). The national law further breaches fundamental principles 
to ensure legal certainty as it contradicts its EU parent law (although these would not find the 
remedy in national law being disapplied). Community citizens, under this current regime, 
cannot accurately nor adequately predict their legal position and therefore their rights in 
advance when they decide to travel to, work or even live in the UK. The UK’s withdrawal from 
the EU (otherwise referred to as “Brexit”) becomes another source of uncertainty as to whether 
the UK will leave the Single Market and Customs Union which will, if the UK chooses to leave 
without agreements, end the UK’s duty to fulfill the free movement principles. Furthermore, 
although not specifically pertinent to the arguments advanced here, national law possibly 
breaches Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights as it impinges on citizens’ 
right to access to justice. Finally, currently national law does not comply with the effectiveness 
and equivalence principles required under EU law.79 The earlier mentioned principles, as they 
pertain to breaches of EU fundamental principles, are discussed to explain and offer a legal 
basis for the advancement of disapplying inconsistent national laws which breach superior EU 
laws.     
 
The arguments presented above have been used to not only identify some of the inconsistent 
judicial practices in the (mis)application of UK national laws in respect of EU law, but also to 
highlight some of the procedural and administrative functions which operate to transgress EU 
law in the UK. Case law is now presented to argue how it is constitutionally possible for 
national legislation and administrative agreements to be disapplied for breaching EU Treaty 
Articles and Directive provisions.  
 
E. Disapplying the RTA88, UDA and UtDA: The Constitutional Argument 
 
It will likely be questioned in the first instance why, in 2020, is an argument being presented 
to use a case established in 1991 to give effect to superior EU law in the courts of a Member 
State. Surely the brightest legal minds will have considered, and by implication rejected, such 
an argument. We write this because naturally this is the “elephant in the room” and without 
addressing it from the outset, it will play on the minds of the reader and possibly distract from 
the opinions presented. Factortame80 began the constitutional revolution in the UK whereby 
an Act which had been established that transgressed EU law should not be enforced. The case 
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law then progressed through Thoburn81 which discussed the different types of Acts and their 
constitutional hierarchy. Finally, HS282 has enabled the Supreme Court to reflect on the 
potential for the disapplication of an Act due to incompatibility with a Directive. Hence, given 
the problems inherent with the statutory (RTA88) and extra-statutory provisions (the UDA and 
UtDA) when considered in light of the MVID and free movement principles, and that in MIB 
v Lewis83 the UK appeal courts seem to accept the transgression of EU law (in some respects) 
and the status of the MIB and the direct effect of Articles 3 and 10 of the MVID, it seems an 
apt time to discuss the potential for the offending national laws to be disapplied as contravening 
the effectiveness of EU law. 
 
If one begins by examining the constitution upon which the UK is based, one of the first 
theorists that springs to mind is Dicey who, as famously instructed to all first-year English law 
students, concluded that the sovereignty of Parliament is supreme – limitless – and therefore it 
may make and unmake any laws which it chooses. Significantly, “no person or body is 
recognized by the law… as having the right to override or set aside the legislation of 
Parliament.”84 Thus, the legal power vested in the country is qualified by a political reality and 
this, for Dicey, is the only hierarchy in place. There is, of course, a hierarchy in existence within 
the sources of law which will be seen between Acts of Parliament, the common law, 
conventions and customs. This is natural. However, the issue is that for Dicey that the Acts 
themselves are of the same legal power and significance. He did not seek to establish a 
hierarchy amongst them. Given the flatness of the structure proposed, the legal status of each 
Act of Parliament is the same. 
 
This view of the legal landscape in which primary legislation exists fails to take into account 
the development of the legal system of the UK, and of what at least became known as 
constitutional statutes – those which were so fundamental that they could not be, implicitly at 
least, reversed (through implied repeal). Thus, whilst they became entrenched in the UK’s legal 
system there remained the possibility of an explicit repeal by a future Parliament if indeed the 
political will allowed. The Constitutional Reform Act 2005, the Human Rights Act 1998 and, 
especially for the purposes of this article, the European Communities Act (ECA) 1972 are each 
examples of Acts of Parliament which had the status granted to them of moving beyond 
“ordinary” Acts and becoming “constitutional.” 
 
We can therefore move forwards on the basis that whilst the UK Parliament and its law-making 
remains supreme, the content of the laws it produces are subject to a hierarchy in which some 
Acts have greater powers and significance than others. To begin, it is important to recognize 
the fundamental impact that the case Factortame85 had on the UK legal system, the rights of 
individuals within the Member States of the EU, and the obligations facing Member States and 
the supremacy of EU law over inconsistent national law. 
 
I. Supremacy of EU Law: A National Courts’ Duty? 
 
National courts of EU Member States have a duty to ensure that the principles of Community 
law are protected, and they voluntarily undertook this duty. Lord Denning’s statement in 
                                                 
81 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 [2002] 3 WLR 247. 
82 Supra note 17. 
83 Supra note 10. 
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Macarthys v Smith86 reflects how in the UK this was achieved through Parliament surrendering 
its sovereignty to the EU through s 2 ECA 1972. However, the surrendering was a voluntary 
act of Parliament and one which it could override if it should so choose. He stated: 
 
If the time should come when our Parliament deliberately passes an Act with the 
intention of repudiating the Treaty or any provision in it or intentionally of acting 
inconsistently with it and says so in express terms then I should have thought that it 
would be the duty of our courts to follow the statute of our Parliament.87  
 
Consequently, unless explicitly provided for in the text or preamble of an Act, Parliament’s 
intention when it legislates is to follow and, if applicable, to give effect to EU law. As 
demonstrated in Unibet (London) Ltd v Justitiekanslern,88 for instance, many authorities were 
provided where EU Member States are obliged to give effect to the Community law and to 
ensure that rights conferred on EU individuals by these laws are protected. Therefore, and to 
do so, national courts must work in conformity with EU law and take into account the purpose 
of EU legislation to ensure compatibility and a consistency in approach. Further, in R v 
Transport Secretary Ex p Factortame Ltd (No.2)89 Lord Bridge stated that the ECA 1972 is 
clear that EU Member States shall give priority to Community law where there are conflicts 
with national laws. National courts cannot compromise on individuals’ rights, or permit any 
breaches to EU principles. Moreover, Lord Harwich held that Community rights conferred on 
EU citizens were to be protected by national courts and could be, in these circumstances, 
directly enforced. In this respect, the courts in Member States are not allowed to undermine 
Community law by, for instance, preventing its effectiveness. To give effect to this principle, 
national courts were able to set aside any rules that undermine the effectiveness of EU law and 
were to enforce Community law.90 However, in regard of an award for damage to victims of a 
State’s failure to implement EU law as required (Francovich),91 Evans v Secretary of State for 
the Environment, Transport and the Regions92 clarified that such award is only granted 
conditional on the satisfaction of three conditions (i) the law in breach shall grant individual 
direct right in regard of the disputed area; (ii) the breach shall be sufficiently serious; and (iii) 
the loss to the victim was the direct consequence of the breach by the State (the loss was due 
to direct failure of implementing EU law).  
 
II. The Tri-Partite Test – The Limiting Factor 
 
It was in Delaney v Pickett93 where the Court of Appeal referred to the judgment of Jay J at 
first instance where he held that the MVID satisfied the tests and allowed the claimant to 
recover damages from the UK. Typically, it is the second test which limits the success of 
recovering compensation. It is trite comment and the arguments are well rehearsed elsewhere 
but essentially Member States were to be protected where they had breached EU law, and this 
had caused the claimant quantifiable loss, but this had been the result of an innocent mistake 
or administrative error on the part of the State. It would be unfair to hold a State liable for each 
loss sustained by claimants in such circumstances, particularly when the Court of Justice was 
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placed as a court of reference to determine any error and offer more clear and purposive 
instruction as to the point of law or the interpretation that should have been used by the court. 
The result was the “sufficiently serious” element of the test which negated the efficacy of the 
remedy of state liability. Of course, in relation to the MVID, the breaches of EU laws and 
principles in national law have often been so flagrant and clear that they pass the threshold for 
establishing the State’s liability. Nevertheless, and as mentioned earlier, even though 
Francovich94 offers some method of remedying the financial losses suffered by the claimant, 
it does not correct the wrong (the breach) by bringing the national law in breach into line with 
its EU parent. Consequently, the victims who choose not to seek this route of remedy would 
suffer the negative consequences of being left uncompensated, which opposes the protective 
purpose of the MVID to facilitate free movement of people and goods throughout the 
Community (see Article 4 MVID which prohibits Member States to carry out insurance border 
checks on vehicles based in other Member States as such checks could amount to a hinderance 
of the principle of free movement).   
 
III. Key Cases and the Development of the UK Constitution 
 
It is unlikely to be controversial to comment that one of the most remarkable movements in the 
history of the EU was the Court of Justice ruling in Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-
Westfalen.95 Here the court empowered national courts to interpret its laws rationally in 
accordance with the wording and the aims of EU law. The EU had created, it will be 
remembered, a “new legal order” in which EU law was superior to national law which was a 
principle establishing the indirect effect of EU law.96 In Marleasing,97 the Court of Justice 
instructed the courts of Member States that they should, as far as is possible, interpret national 
law to give effect to the content and spirit of the EU parent. This philosophy was furthered in 
2004 with the Court’s ruling in Bernhard Pfeiffer et alia v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, 
Kreisverband Walshut eV.98 Here those same national courts, it was emphasized by the Court 
of Justice, should play a greater role in protecting individuals’ rights conferred on them by EU 
laws when interpreting national law. Concurrently, national courts were charged with not 
preventing any provision from undermining the purpose of the MVID.99 These cases 
established that, even prior to the UK joining the EU, EU law was accepted (and had to be 
accepted by new entrant States) as superior to national law. Without such a ceding of 
sovereignty the legal system of the EU and the development from an economic community to 
a union of States would not be achievable. The States, in ensuring EU law was superior to 
national law would have their rights to establish new laws in contradiction of EU law curtailed. 
When interpreting and applying existing laws, which either were created to transpose the 
effects of secondary sources of EU law (Directives) or could be interpreted as being affected 
by an EU law, the courts in those jurisdictions had a positive duty to give effect to the EU law 
(direct parent law or not). Even with the duty of purposive statutory interpretation applying to 
national / EU law, numerous examples have been presented in this article where national courts 
have adopted a holistic approach and concluded that, on the whole, national law conforms with 
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the requirements of the MVID (see Roadpeace).100 Therefore, the value of the Marleasing101 / 
Pfeiffer102 line of reasoning in establishing a consistent interpretation of national law in light 
of the MVID has been haphazard and has not produced any semblance of legal certainty for 
any of the parties to motor vehicle insurance law. While much of this article uses cases where 
the national court has failed to interpret national law consistently with the MVID, positive 
examples do exist (for example Churchill v Wilkinson).103  
 
Most recently in MIB v Lewis104 the Court of Appeal held the MIB to be an emanation of the 
State (reversing years of inconsistent national rulings – indeed by the same judge who had 
previously ruled that the MIB did not possess this status). It also confirmed the direct effect of 
both Articles 3 and 10 MVID. This will provide a greater range of rights to be exercised in UK 
national courts – basing arguments directly on Articles 3 and 10 MVID and thus superseding 
the offending aspects of the RTA88, the UDA and the UtDA. However, and to place the 
significance of this judgment in context, the direct effect of the Articles will not, in the absence 
of knowledgeable lawyers and a receptive judiciary, result in significant change in the 
application of the law. For legal certainty, the case law may be amended through subsequent 
judgments but the provisions within the legislation and extra-statutory Agreements will not be 
changed (which compromises legal certainty). However, the status of the MIB, as a body of 
the State, will perhaps ease the argument that the Agreements it produces with the Secretary of 
State are susceptible to disapplication in a similar way to Acts of Parliament and functioning 
administrative agreements. 
 
Ultimately, the UK judiciary too often seem unwilling to consider EU law when establishing a 
ruling, or cases heard at the same time but in different courts in the UK have opposite views 
on how to give effect to EU law,105 which leads to an inconsistent interpretation between the 
two laws. This in turn undermines the protective purpose of the MVID.  
 
IV. Factortame, Thoburn and HS2: A Triumvirate of Constitutional Development 
 
If an argument is to be made that it is perhaps necessary, and possible – both legally and 
politically – to disapply the RTA88, UDA and UtDA in areas where they breach the MVID, it 
is right to begin with the case which established the change in the UK’s constitution. The UK 
does not possess a constitutional court, its constitution is uncodified and subject to change, and 
the separation of powers does not grant a right for any court to strike down legislation. These 
facts are an established feature in UK constitutional law. 
 
IV.1. Factortame 
 
The problem in this case began when Spanish owned vessels started overfishing in UK 
territorial waters. Under the Treaty of Rome, the free movement principles enabled EU citizens 
to enter another Member State with the intention of working. The Spanish fishermen were such 
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individuals. They had started by fishing and selling their catch in their home country, but soon 
discovered that other fish which did not sell particularly well in Spain did have a market in the 
UK. This lead to the influx of new entrants to the fishing market in the UK and local fishermen 
were concerned about their livelihoods. It has to be remembered that these fishermen were 
fishing around the ports in the South of the country and these were traditionally Conservative-
voting constituencies. With a threat that these areas would change their political votes, 
especially having seen what the Conservative governments had done to the coal and steel 
industries in the North of the country, the Government was faced with a problem. Should it 
follow EU law and continue to allow the Spanish fishermen (and citizens from other Member 
States) access to the waters and the fish, or should it establish legislation to curtail the influx? 
The result was the Government ceding to the pressure by the national fishing lobby and 
enacting the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 (MSA88).  The MSA88 imposed conditions on those 
who wished to fish in British waters. Either the fishermen had to be domiciled in the UK or the 
vessel itself had to be registered in the UK. This would effectively limit access to fishermen 
from other Member States who would be unlikely to wish to satisfy either criterion. Of course, 
the Act contradicts one of the most important principles of the Community (free movement). 
The argument presented in court106 was for the EU Treaty offending MSA88 to be disapplied 
so as not to breach this fundamental Treaty right. It was appealed to the House of Lords who 
believed that applying the requested intervention might subvert the concept of Parliamentary 
sovereignty as the MSA88 was approved by Parliament107 and the judiciary had no 
constitutional power to refuse to give effect to an Act of Parliament. Consequently, the Lords 
referred the case to the Court of Justice which declared that the MSA88 breached EU law and 
as the law of EU is supreme,108 interim relief was necessary and the UK chose to disapply the 
Act accordingly.109  
 
Prior to Factortame,110 it was understood that national courts have no power to strike down 
any legislation passed by the Parliament. The role of the courts is to interpret the law, not to 
make it.111 However, and although the Court of Justice empowers national courts of EU 
Member States to read and interpret legislation in a way that gives effect to EU law through 
consistent interpretation and methods of reasoning to ensure consistency in the Community, 
such empowerment is still limited in the UK and any interpretation must not go against the 
spirit of the UK legislation, in spite of the fact that Factortame112 is a British case. Nonetheless, 
this may raise another question of the constitutional position of the courts as its interpretation 
of EU law may lead it to either overrule Parliament or to disregard EU law in a case of 
irreconcilable differences between the two. The ruling in Factortame113 provoked outrage as 
                                                 
106 The case was brought by Spanish company Factortame Ltd. and almost 100 other Spanish fishing companies. 
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110 Supra note 12. 
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112 Supra note 19. 
113 Supra note 19. 
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to how it undermines Parliamentary sovereignty.114 The government however, was not 
ignorant115 of the fact (as is also the case in matters related to third-party victims of road traffic 
accidents) that any legislation that undermines any principle of EU law such as free movement 
is a clear breach of EU law, which the UK is legally bound by, and negative consequences may 
follow as a result of passing the MSA88. However, the government’s challenge to the Court of 
Appeal was dismissed, and the House of Lords stated that the disapplication was due to a breach 
of one of the most important principles of Community law, and therefore justified in the 
circumstances.  
 
The MSA88 holds a unique place in the history of the UK constitution being the only Act 
which the courts would not apply. It was for Parliament to determine whether the MSA88 as it 
was written should be applied. If it was the intention of Parliament to breach a fundamental 
principle of EU law, it was able to do so. Adopting Denning’s position in Macarthys v Smith,116 
the national courts would follow Parliament’s instruction to adhere to the national law even 
where it was in conflict with a superior EU law. The EU law in question was only superior in 
the instance of the MSA88 because Parliament had instructed the judiciary of this point in the 
ECA 1972 s 2, 117 and Parliament was equally empowered to revoke this instruction in relation 
to the MSA88 or generally to all laws if it chose.118 The Lords had decided that such a 
fundamental breach could not have been the intention of Parliament and they held accordingly.  
 
IV.2. Thoburn 
 
It will be noted that one of the most significant features of the Factortame (No. 2)119 case is 
that despite the importance that it has for the UK and its relationship with the EU, there is a 
general lack of detail and discussion on the constitutional theory and practicalities of, on the 
one hand, the principal of parliamentary sovereignty, and on the other the supremacy of EU 
law. It was not until 2002 in the Thoburn120 case where the reasoning of the court shed light on 
this particular issue. The case was widely known and considered at the turn of the new 
millennium. Council Directive 80/181/EEC had established the requirement for goods widely 
sold (exceptions were incorporated in the Directive but do not require consideration for the 
purposes of this article) to have the legal units of weight represented according to metric 
measurements. The Directive further allowed for supplementary indications of measurements 
– essentially allowing Member States such as the UK to continue using the Imperial 
measurement system until the end of 2009. The incorporation of the Directive in to national, 
amending legislation (the Weights and Measures Act 1985), led to four appellants, known 
widely at the time as the “metric martyrs,” who had been convicted of offences relating to the 
use of Imperial measurements. It was in the use of the “Henry VIII” powers by the Secretary 
of State to amend the 1985 Act which was the focus of the appeal. The main argument was that 
the amendment to the 1985 Act had impliedly repealed s 2(2) of the ECA 1972 on the basis 
                                                 
114 Adam Wagner, Does Parliamentary Sovereignty Still Reign Supreme?, THE GUARDIAN, January 27, (2011), 
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2011/jan/27/supreme-court-parliamentary-sovereignty (last visited Nov 11, 
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115 The law lords held that the government had deliberately decided to run the risk of introducing the legislation, 
knowing that it could be unlawful. Justice required that the wrong should be made good. 
116 Supra note 86 at [329]. 
117 The ECA provides, by section 2(4), that European Union Law is to prevail over inconsistent Acts of Parliament 
“passed or to be passed.” 
118 At least this was the thinking at the time until the Miller and Cherry cases clarified the mechanism need to 
repeal the ECA 1972. 
119 Supra note 16. 
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that the ECA 1972 established a general provision regarding amending legislation and the more 
recent 1985 Act was a specific provision. Laws LJ was not convinced with the legal basis of 
the argument but, to provide certainty regarding the issue in case he was incorrect in his 
analysis, Laws LJ continued by examining the nature of the ECA 1972 and whether and how 
implied appeal through inconsistent provisions in later statutes might affect its standing. 
Previous authorities were discussed and the fundamental principles which are very well known 
and need not be replicated here were considered. The result was that Parliament and the 
legislature cannot bind future parliaments – the doctrine of implied repeal continued as a 
fundamental matter of British national constitutional law. 
 
However, Laws LJ went further. He remarked that implied repeal is actually context sensitive 
and, as legislation could be “ordinary” or of a “constitutional” nature, implied repeal operates 
as it is known to do so in relation to ordinary legislation. With regards to constitutional 
statutes,121 these had to be treated differently. Therefore, at para. 63, Laws LJ considered: 
 
Ordinary statutes may be impliedly repealed. Constitutional statutes may not. For the 
repeal of a constitutional Act or the abrogation of a fundamental right to be effected by 
statute, the court would apply this test: is it shown that the legislature’s actual – not 
imputed, constructive or presumed – intention was to effect the repeal or abrogation? I 
think the test could only be met by express words in the later statute, or by words so 
specific that the inference of an actual determination to effect the result contended for 
was irresistible.  
 
The ECA 1972 is a constitutional statute, but the overriding nature of the UK’s Parliament, it 
being sovereign, must surely work to resist any limitations on its own power. Perhaps Wade is 
correct and sovereignty is now a “freely adjustable commodity.”122 The answer seems to be 
found in the text of the ECA 1972 itself and the powers it provides the judiciary in matters of 
resolving conflicts between national and EU laws. In terms of implied repeal, the ECA 1972 is 
impenetrable to implicit repeal or contradiction, albeit still subject to the express repeal of a 
sovereign Parliament. Thus Thoburn123 establishes a continuation of the theory of 
parliamentary sovereignty. Therefore, in relation to any difference in approach by the judiciary 
in its interpretation of the RTA88, UDA, and UtDA, the ECA 1972 is immune from any sense 
of implied repeal. It takes precedence over the statute and extra-statutory provisions and the 
clear instruction in ECA 1972 s 2 that “All rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and 
restrictions… created or arising by or under the Treaties, and all such remedies and 
procedures… provided for by or under the Treaties, are without further enactment to be given 
legal effect or used in the United Kingdom” instructs the judiciary as to this supremacy. 
 
IV.3. R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport 
 
The case involved the application of Directive 2011/92/EU and its imposition of decision-
making in relation to, for the purposes of the case, the construction of the proposed high-speed 
rail network known as HS2. The Supreme Court was tasked with deciding if the UK’s approach 
to the process adopted in HS2124 was in compliance with the requirements laid down in the 
Directive. The mechanism used to give effect to the transposition of the Directive was a “hybrid 
                                                 
121 The Magna Carta; The Bill of Rights 1689; the European Communities Act 1972; the Human Rights Act 1998; 
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Bill” – one which begins life as a public bill, but which adds an additional select committee 
stage following the second reading in each House.125 It is at this stage where objections from 
those directly affected by the bill can be raised and where issues may be heard. It was this 
mechanism which was scrutinized by the Court with the issue of the potential concern that this 
form of scrutiny may encroach into the relationship between Parliament and the courts (per 
Lord Reed). It transpires that Lord Reed did not consider there to be any constitutional problem 
with the manner in which the Directive had to be implemented in national law, but what was 
interesting was the obiter provided where he hypothesized what would have been the result 
had there been such a problem from the Directive. 
 
Lord Reed surmised that had the Directive called upon the UK to adopt a system of close 
judicial scrutiny of a bill on its passage through Parliament, the aligning of EU law with 
national law would not have been as straightforward as the application of the doctrine of the 
supremacy of EU law. The doctrine derives from the ECA 1972 and matters regarding conflicts 
between constitutional principles must be resolved by national courts according to principles 
of national constitutional law. Further, Factortame (No. 2)126 was of no use in these 
circumstances as the matter there was the breach of EU law following the enactment of an Act 
of Parliament, not the process of the making of national law and its compatibility with superior 
EU law. The conclusion to be drawn is that in HS2,127 Lord Reed is explaining how the 
application of EU law in the creation and interpretation of national law is not merely subject to 
the existence of the ECA 1972, but rather includes many other dimensions to national 
constitutional law which may have an impact. 
 
V. Disapplication beyond the MSA88? 
 
The three cases mentioned come together to form the basis for a legal argument that the directly 
effective elements of the MVID, where they are breached by the RTA88, the UDA and the 
UtDA may lead to the disapplication of those offending aspects of national law. In Factortame 
(No. 2),128 the decision of the Lords to direct the disapplication of sections of the MSA88 was 
due to the ECA 1972 providing for EU law to take precedence over national law and the 
MSA88 Act not derogating from the constitutional powers of the ECA 1972. Had Parliament 
intended the MSA88 to take effect over the provisions contained in the ECA 1972 it could and 
would have explicitly done so. Thoburn129 continues this approach of parliamentary 
sovereignty and pragmatic primacy of EU law by demonstrating Parliament’s continued power 
to derogate from EU law, albeit when it expressly identifies its intention to do so. The problem 
with this approach, whilst theoretically sound, is that it begins to unravel when considered in 
reality. As has been demonstrated throughout the Brexit negotiations and internal wrangling in 
Parliament, it is not simply the case that the government can choose to remove or suspend parts 
of the ECA 1972 when it seems politically expedient to do so. This would require an Act of 
Parliament specifying the clear intention for the particular Act in question to be read as 
intending to circumvent or directly transgress aspects of the ECA 1972. In its absence, there 
would also be the political fall-out from the EU itself, a breach by the UK of its EU obligations 
and a denial of the legitimacy of the action by the Court of Justice. As a consequence, while 
                                                 
125 The Speaker in the House defined a hybrid bill as “a public bill which affects a particular private interest in a 
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the position in Thoburn130 is academically correct in as far as the UK’s ability to derogate from 
its EU obligations and the primacy of EU law is concerned, practically, however, this is little 
more than a theoretical construct. There also remains the very real issue of what type of statute 
will be necessary to override an existing constitutional statute. This calls into question issues 
of hierarchy between such laws and, as provided by Laws LJ at para. 63, a “specific” form of 
derogation will be required to achieve an “inference of an actual determination to effect the 
result contended for was irresistible.” This will allow for protection against accidental or 
incidental derogation, but the interpretation of such will fall to each court to determine. What 
it does not achieve though, is reconciling the stark difference between traditional legal theory 
(Thoburn131 reinforces the principle of sovereignty of Parliament and its legitimacy that 
specific legislation can derogate from otherwise entrenched legislation with the status of being 
“constitutional” in nature) and political reality. The UK voluntarily acceded to be a Member 
State of the EU and to accept with this status the primacy of EU over national law in areas 
where the EU has competence. It is naïve to infer that Parliament may simply express a 
willingness to override the EU Treaty and for this position to be accepted by the courts. 
Although, of course, this is what the Thoburn132 judgment appeared to suggest. However, 
towards the conclusion of his judgment, Laws LJ offers an interesting insight into a 
modernizing of that constitutional view: 
 
[Parliament] Being sovereign, it cannot abandon its sovereignty... This is, of course, the 
traditional doctrine of sovereignty. If it is to be modified, it certainly cannot be done by 
the incorporation of external texts. The conditions of Parliament’s legislative 
supremacy in the United Kingdom necessarily remain in the UK’s hands. But the 
traditional doctrine has in my judgment been modified. It has been done by the common 
law, wholly consistently with constitutional principle.133 
 
Here Laws LJ notes that Parliament’s legislative authority derives from its common law roots 
and it is in the common law where it may be subject to modification. Therefore, as the common 
law is the source of Parliamentary sovereignty, it may also be used to alter what is known of 
as sovereignty. This, for Laws LJ at para. 60 of his judgment, has been ably demonstrated in 
respect of the creation of exceptions to the doctrine of implied repeal. It also permits, if such 
an argument is advanced to a natural conclusion, for the common law to decide, if it wishes, to 
create constitutional legislation which, through interpretation, are so important that it would be 
inappropriate for a Parliament to nullify – implicitly or explicitly. The common law will 
thereby be the arbiter of what might be recognized as constitutional legislation or conversely 
of a lesser hierarchical standing. Hence the Thoburn134 ruling is at times confused as to which 
authority (parliamentary or common law) determines the entrenchment of legislation. 
Ultimately, Thoburn135 reflects a new view of the constitution. Here Parliament’s sovereignty 
is not so much a “political fact” in the Wade sense of its understanding,136 rather it is a legal 
phenomenon subject to the common law it need not invoke unconstitutional behavior on the 
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part of the courts to produce a Factortame (No. 2)137 and Thoburn138 result. These cases are the 
very result of the courts “discharging their constitutional role.”139 
 
This brings us to the most recent case of HS2.140 If we accept the proposition of Lord Reed in 
his dictum, the stark and binary distinction between ordinary legislation and constitutional 
legislation is too simplistic in approach. Thoburn141 established the distinction and hierarchy 
between ordinary and constitutional legislation, but left open the debate of whether all 
constitutional legislation is of the same status. Could there be nuances and hierarchies present 
in constitutional laws? This is the place where Lords Neuberger and Mance offered their 
reasoning on the matter by reference to: 
 
Article 9 of the Bill of Rights, one of the pillars of constitutional settlement which 
established the rule of law in England in the 17th century, precludes the impeaching or 
questioning in any court of debates or proceedings in Parliament. Article 9 was 
described by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in the House of Lords in Pepper v Hart [1993] 
AC 593, 638, as “a provision of the highest constitutional importance” which “should 
not be narrowly construed”. 
 
Thus some constitutional principles may be more “constitutional” than others and could an EU 
Directive be constructed which would require national courts to set aside the principle due to 
the superiority of EU law? For Lords Neuberger and Mance the answer was that it probably 
would not. They seemed to misrepresent the House of Lords’ instruction relating to the 
treatment of national law which contradicts EU law via the ECA 1972 (that such legislation 
was to be held as “invalid” when really what the Lords held was that such laws could be 
dissapplied by the courts). However, they proceeded by explaining how the ECA 1972 could 
not be interpreted as meaning that all legislation, especially those dealing with, for example, 
the rule of law, which were in conflict with EU law could be abrogated. 
 
The analysis of the above cases is used to demonstrate that the basic notion of the supremacy 
of EU law over inconsistent national law derives its status from the ECA 1972. This was 
established, if were needed, in Factortame (No. 2)142 and through Thoburn,143 the court further 
offered direction that the ECA 1972 was a constitutional statute and thus immune from implied 
repeal. For future legislation to override the principles of the ECA 1972 would have required 
specific and explicit repeal of those principles. More recently in HS2144 the Supreme Court 
explained how constitutional laws – be they legislative or established through the common law 
– are not equal and a hierarchy exists. Thereby explaining a further nuance to laws which may 
be repealed and through which measures will be required. The ECA 1972 was deemed to have 
the status of being fundamentally constitutional in nature and therefore Parliament did not 
intend for future legislation to abrogate the principles within it lightly. If we return to 
Thoburn145 it is readily evident that the RTA88 would be defined as ordinary legislation and 
would not require discussion of the hierarchy between constitutional laws. Essentially, the ECA 
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1972 trumps the RTA88, and using this analysis even more so in relation to administrative 
provisions contained within the UDA and UtDA (established as they were between a body 
designated as an emanation of the State and the Secretary of State), and it would follow that it 
is available to national courts to disapply those national provisions which contradict directly 
effective elements of an EU directive (superior EU laws). Certainly, the contradicting aspects 
of the RTA88, UDA and UtDA could not be read as overriding the judiciaries’ obligation 
flowing from ECA 1972 s 2 “to be given legal effect or used in the United Kingdom.” 
 
Of course, the entire purpose of the discussion provided by Lords Neuberger and Mance is to 
further explain the very blunt constitutional tool which is Parliament’s sovereignty that enables 
it to abrogate and derogate from EU law in as far as it chooses, albeit with the proviso that it 
makes such an intention sufficiently transparent and obvious. The judgment of the Lords 
tempers this approach through categorization of the ECA 1972 as being but one constitutional 
law which is potentially limited through the application of other constitutional laws – be they 
legislative or established through the common law. The status of the ECA 1972 does not credit 
it with a power to prevail over all other inconsistent Acts of Parliament, but it does offer the 
starting point for arguments regarding the hierarchy and status of laws and whether implicit or 
explicit derogation is necessary to determine the primacy of EU law. This rejects the previously 
held view that the constitutional landscape as provided for by Dicey is flat and introduces a 
more uneven constitutional order which will require calibration through judicial 
pronouncement. 
 
F. The Goal of Remedying UK Motor Vehicle Insurance Law: Interim Relief or 
Permanent Disapplication? 
 
There is no such power that can prevent the UK’s national courts from granting interim relief 
or to permanently disapply the national motor insurance law otherwise such power would harm 
the effectiveness of EU law (see Schorsch Meier GmbH v Hennin).146 The MSA88 was 
believed to be in breach of a fundamental EU principle (free movement principle) where 
individuals and businesses used to rely on to have the right to access to the UK fishing quota 
as free movement shall not be restricted. Aspects of the motor insurance laws are in breach of 
the same EU fundamental principle (free movement). The applicants in Factortame,147 after an 
unsuccessful claim,148 sought judicial review in the UK and to remove restriction on their rights 
of fishing in the UK water.149 The judicial review, however, failed to achieve anything of 
substance. As the judicial order to restrain the government from the threat that the Act 
undermines EU law and to make restitution to the claimants was refused, the case was referred 
to the Court of Justice through the House of Lords.150 Thereafter, the Court of Justice held that 
national laws of EU Member States should have no effect whatsoever beside EU law (national 
laws cannot prevent national courts from granting interim relief where EU law is involved in a 
dispute).151 The Court of Justice held that the provisions of the MSA88 contravene EU law and 
therefore to be disapplied by UK national courts.152 In the light of the Court of Justice 
judgment, the House of Lords granted an injunction in favor of the claimant (Factortame).153 
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The motor insurance law has been challenged and many claims have proven unsuccessful. 
Some were referred to the Court of Justice and some compensation was granted. However, it 
failed to remove the illegality of exclusion clauses and procedural rules. A judicial review 
failed too to bring the law into line with EU law.154 Therefore, referral to the Court of Justice, 
if national courts failed to fulfil its duty and disapply the law, may need to be considered.   
 
The MSA88 was disapplied by the UK national courts and the victims of the 1988 Act were 
duly compensated. Therefore, the authors argue that the directly effective aspects of the MVID 
(Arts. 3 and 10) require the offending aspects of the RTA88, UDA and UtDA shall be 
disapplied and third-party victims of road traffic accidents who suffered losses or injuries in 
the past and failed to secure fair compensation due to breaches of EU law shall be compensated 
accordingly. For instance, in Factortame III155 the Court of Justice held that the European 
Commission can take actions against any EU Member States that could be liable for damages 
where it fails to comply with EU law. As explained earlier, the motor insurance law breaches 
more than one fundamental EU principle. Each of which is sufficient to have the law disapplied 
(the provisions and clauses in breach). 
 
The power to disapply the RTA88 due to its infringement of the free movement of goods and 
of persons is compelling when compared with the infringement occurring in Factortame.156 It 
will be remembered in Factortame157 that the affected Spanish fishermen were not prevented, 
entirely, from access to British waters to undertake their professional activities, rather the 
MSA88 applied conditions to be satisfied in order for such access to be effective. Hence, had 
the fishermen domiciled themselves in the UK or had registered their vessels in the UK, access 
would have been granted. Compare this with the current state of the RTA88. In its current 
reading and application, the Act does not prevent the free movement of people and goods from 
the EU to the UK. The RTA88 makes the provision for the protection of third-party victims of 
motor vehicle accidents less beneficial than citizens would experience if the EU law was 
correctly applied. However, on closer inspection, it may even be more compelling to disapply 
the offending provisions within the RTA88 when compared with the MSA88 as in 
Factortame,158 had the Spanish fishermen complied with the criteria identified in that Act, 
access, and therefore the movement of goods and persons, could have been achieved. In respect 
of the RTA88, and to give just one example of s. 145 and the geographic scope of compulsory 
motor vehicle insurance (per Vnuk),159 it is actually not possible for an affected citizen to 
protect themselves against the actions of a negligent uninsured motorist for an accident 
occurring on private land. There are no comparable criteria within the RTA88 which, upon 
satisfaction, grant protection to the citizen. Citizens in the EU have the right to expect EU law 
to be applied in each Member State, and the MVID and the Court of Justice have clarified the 
issue regarding the geographic scope of compulsory motor vehicle insurance. That the RTA88 
has not been amended since the ruling in 2014, the judiciary seem unwilling, even in recent 
cases, to understand or appreciate the significance and nuance within the reasoning of Vnuk,160 
Andrade161 and Juliana,162 and subsequently citizens may lack confidence in whether the law 
will be applied correctly and whether they will have access to the protection afforded at the EU 
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level, this may have tangible effect on free movement. Personal insurance cover will protect 
the individual against associated medical costs, but they are unlikely to cover the suite of losses 
that would have been available against an insured and identified driver, and which should have 
been available through the MIB as insurer of last resort in the event of no such cover being 
available. Yet the national law fails in this duty, the courts have frequently not applied EU law 
in any semblance of consistency with the provisions in the MVID, and the consequence is the 
exposure of risk to the individual third-party victim. Such a victim lacks the ability, that was 
even available to the Spanish fishermen, to facilitate free movement on terms comparable with 
citizens in other Member States. 
 
HS2 has extended the principle of disapplying an Act of Parliament in Factortame163 based on 
a Treaty Article and extended its reach to the disapplication on the basis of an EU Directive. 
Hence, even if the view is that motor vehicle insurance law is not a direct aspect of the free 
movement principles of the EU (which, in any respect, we believe they are) and a Treaty 
Article, the MVID, as a Directive, is not in any meaningful way (hierarchical as opposed to its 
content) to the EIA Directive. They both impose obligations on Member State to achieve the 
aims within and indeed, given that aspects of the MVID have been held to have direct effect, 
it could be even argued that it has a greater argument for requiring offending national law to 
be disapplied than the EIA.164 
 
In HS2,165 at para. 191, Lord Neuberger and Lord Mance refer to the source of the EIA for the 
subsequent adoption of the UK legislation. As the MVID began its life in 1972, albeit inspired 
by the UK RTA 1930, it has through iterations in [1983, 1990, 2000, 2005 and 2009] initially 
been the precursor for aspects of the RTA88, and much more comprehensively the UDA [1988, 
1999 and 2015] and UtDA [1996, 2003 and 2017]. Thus, those provisions therein must be 
viewed “as subject to a pre-condition that the legislative process must have enabled the 
objectives pursued by the Directive to be achieved.”166 Further, at para. 206, Lord Neuberger 
and Lord Mance confirm  
 
Under the European Communities Act 1972, United Kingdom courts have also 
acknowledged that European law requires them to treat domestic statutes, whether 
passed before or after the 1972 Act, as invalid if and to the extent that they cannot be 
interpreted consistently with European law. 
 
G. Concluding Remarks 
 
Compulsory motor insurance law is of great importance for the functioning of the Community 
and consequently on individuals’ movement (as drivers, passengers and victims). The 
protection within the Community must not be affected by or based on, for instance, where an 
accident takes place as far as it happened on Community land. In other words, victims shall not 
be disadvantaged as to their claim, depending upon in which State the accident occurred, rather 
they should be treated equally in terms of the levels of compensation provided as well as to the 
procedural rules applicable in national courts.167 Directives were chosen as the legislative 
method to achieve such goals and they create the legal framework to guarantee that 
compensation is always available for victims of motor vehicle accidents by facilitating a claim 
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directly against the responsible driver, their insurer (if applicable) or where impossible, from 
the relevant compensatory body. The MVID ensures that Member States have very little margin 
of discretion when it comes to derogating from these responsibilities, for example through the 
operation of contractual exclusion clauses. Nevertheless, and as far as the UK is concerned, the 
government and the judiciary (interpreted broadly) seem to reject the notion that the MVID can 
have a broad interpretation so as would mean that the UK failed to fulfil its duty to implement 
the MVIDs effectively. However, some of the blame for this state of affairs may be levelled at 
the EU itself as the Commission has failed to take any action in this respect to challenge UK 
national law (see for instance, Lord Clyde’s argument in Clarke v Kato).168 Yet, given the 
political dimension to the decisions of the Commission to seek infringement claims against 
Member States169 and its complete discretion in this function,170 it is possible to excuse its lack 
of action in this regard. 
 
The article has identified those aspects of UK motor vehicle insurance law which contravene 
the MVID and undermine the free movement principles of the EU. Also, through Factortame 
(No. 2),171 it is constitutionally permissible for the courts to disapply an Act of Parliament that 
breaches a fundamental aspect of EU law. Thoburn172 provides that “ordinary” Acts of 
Parliament cannot implicitly repeal a “constitutional” Act, and thus the ECA 1972 could not 
be deemed to have been altered by the later RTA88. In HS2,173 the dicta of the Supreme Court 
identify that a hierarchy exists between national constitutional Acts (which is not as relevant 
for the argument we present here but is an interesting area for development – perhaps in a post-
Brexit UK with future trade deals and the basis on which they are concluded), but also that an 
EU Directive has the power, at least in theory, to require the changing (and possibly 
disapplication) of a national UK Act of Parliament.  
 
UK national law has led to a lesser level of protection for the victims of motor vehicle accidents 
than is required under EU law. It has and continues to create uncertainty for all parties as to 
their legal rights and obligations. Given the problems with meaningful action by the State to 
rectify the law (see for example Vnuk174 and the continued lack of instruction in the statutory 
and extra-statutory laws relating to the compulsory motor vehicle insurance on private land), 
the most compelling way to provide this certainty and to ensure the fulfilment of the UK’s 
obligations under EU law is for those offending aspects of the RTA88, the UDA and the UtDA 
to be disapplied. 
                                                 
168 Clarke v Kato [1998] 233 N.R. 381 (HL). 
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